Sunday, April 1, 2012

World Economy – Spillover from the financial crisis

The slowdown of economic growth in the US and Europe after the financial crisis 2008-09 is an inevitable consequence of over-leveraged growth in the years before the crisis. The downward adjustment of asset prices, particularly in housing, and necessary fiscal adjustments create conditions which are not conducive for growth in the US and Europe in the medium term. This should come as no surprise as history has shown that after deep financial crises it took economies several years to recover to historic growth rates.

The expansive monetary policy of the US Fed as well as the European Central Bank (ECB) can only provide temporary relief, particularly for the ailing banking systems. In the medium term, the central banks will have to retreat from this extraordinary provision of liquidity to the markets and will have to mop up excess liquidity to avoid inflation. There is a discussion among economists as to the benefits and costs of those large liquidity operations. Notwithstanding the benefits in the short- to medium term with regard to the reassurance of financial markets and the low interest rates, there are considerable costs which have to be taken into account.


On a global scale, the revised risk perceptions of investors as to country risks has led to large inflows of  liquidity into emerging markets with upward impacts on asset prices in real estate and equity markets as well as on emerging market currencies. What the Brazilian president Dilmah Rousseff has called a monetary tsunami is putting severe pressure on the management capacity of central banks in emerging economies, walking on a tightrope between shoring up growth and containing inflation.

Furthermore, the international liquidity is clearly supporting the increase of commodity and food prices, with negative consequences for commodity importers and the poor in developing countries. An additional feature of global capital flows after the crisis has been their volatility, particularly affecting countries where economic fundamentals had not changed, but risk aversion of international, particularly European banks, has led to short-term disinvestment of capital from emerging markets for internal reasons of banks.


In Europe, the liquidity provision to European Banks and Southern European sovereigns through the Long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) of the ECB, as well as the financial firewalls in the Euro-Zone (EFSF, ESM), do help to calm the markets in the short term, but they provide only breathing space which has to be used by banks and governments to restructure. Without bold structural reforms particularly in Southern Europe the liquidity provision will fail to reach its aims in the long run. There are indications, however, that weak governments as well as weak banks will not use the breathing space as required. Thus, the medium-term perspective for the Euro-Zone is not very positive, since there will be no return to normal market refinancing for some banks as well as for some sovereigns within the next 2-3 years.


For Asia all this is a clear case for gaining more resilience with regard to global capital flows by further developing domestic and regional financial markets. It is also a case for strengthening the intermediation of Asian savings into domestic and global investments by an ever stronger financial sector in Asia.

Dr. Peter Wolff
Head of Department "World Economy and Development Financing"
Leiter der Abteilung "Weltwirtschaft und Entwicklungsfinanzierung"


DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK (DIE)
German Development Institute - Institute Allemand de Développement